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Psyche and Faith - Beyond Professionalism
Gerrit Glas
1. Introduction
The purpose of this final chapter is, first of all, to raise some of the
questions which motivated the organizers of the conference.
Secondly, I will comment on the answers that have been given to
these questions, especially in The Netherlands.
Next, an attempt will be made to systematize these answers and to
sketch the outline of a synthesis and reformulation.
Finally, I will specify a number of subjects that might be put on the
agenda of priorities for future investigations.
2. Professionalism and secularization
First, which questions and preoccupations guided the organizers of the
conference? From what background discussion did these questions and
concerns originate?
The briefest way to clarify this is to focus on two terms: professional-
ism and secularization. What concerned the organizers is the tendency to
secularism that seems to be inherent in professionalism, or, at least, in a
rather common understanding of professionalism. This tendency should be
distinguished from the secularism of professionals. Many professionals,
certainly, do not adhere to any religion. They see their work as complete-
ly disengaged from any spiritual orientation, Christian or otherwise.
However, the organizers of the conference had something else in mind.
They were primarily concerned with the kind of secularism that seems to
be implicated in professional activity as such, i.e., in a particular, overly
narrow understanding of professional activity.
To be a professional implies that one is qualified to accomplish
specific tasks and activities. The fulfilment of these tasks presupposes a
certain level of expertise. To be professional implies that one is able to
meet certain standards and criteria. These standards and criteria are
related to a limited domain of activities. The boundaries of this domain
are determined, in part, by the kinds of knowledge on which professional-
ism is based, i.e., scientific and technical knowledge. There are, of
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course, other features which contribute to the traditional notion of the
professional: commitment to the good of others and a code of (pro-
fessional) ethics. Both features leave room for professionals who ground
their concern for others and their ethics in a religious tradition. In our
age, however, the definition of professionalism is heavily dominated by
the scientific point of view. To be an expert means that one's activities are
based as much as possible on scientific knowledge and/or technical skill.
Roughly speaking, scientific knowledge results from the process of
abstraction. Scientists focus their attention on a small, often a microscopic
segment of reality in order to unravel general relations between specific
properties of that segment of reality. Consequently, scientific knowledge
is both more general and more restricted than ordinary knowledge. The
increase in accuracy and detail is achieved at the expense of a narrowing
of one's view to a discrete part of reality. There is nothing wrong with
this, as long as the scientist acknowledges the abstract nature of scientific
models and theories.
Clinicians, psychotherapists and other experts in mental health care, of
course, are not scientists. However, their activities are guided by models
and theories which draw upon scientific knowledge. The horizon of
professional activity is shaped and narrowed by these models and theories.
This narrowing and shaping is both logically necessary and practically
unavoidable. It is precisely this which makes clinicians and therapists
experts.
The critical issue, here, is that abstraction easily leads to isolation,
i.e., to reductionism. As a result, clinicians may become blind to the
intricate interconnections among emotional, motivational, and religious
roots of psychopathology. Professionalism implies specialization, limiting
oneself to a particular feature, and intervening in just that segment of
behavior in which, according to the relevant theory or model, something
doesn't function properly. However, in everyday practice the problems
with which therapists are confronted are almost always multi-faceted and
complex. They find expression in several domains of functioning. As a
consequence, by concentrating on a limited characteristic of a particular
problem one may overlook equally important features such as normative
or religious issues. So, the unavoidable one-sidedness of scientific theories
could amount to practical secularism.
Of course, this does not imply a rejection of abstraction as such.
Scientific models reduce reality. They also mold our way of looking at
reality. I repeat my assertion that there is nothing wrong with this. It is
simply the way in which science works. Professionalism, also, cannot do
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without it. However, clinicians and therapists often find themselves in a
situation in which this legitimate reduction can not be distinguished from
illegitimate reductionism. Particularly susceptible to this reductionism are
those clinicians and therapists who ignore the abstract nature of scientific
knowledge. Theories and models are considered by them as accurate
descriptions of reality itself. These practitioners forget that theories, first
and foremost, try to explain, i.e., try to construe general relations among
variables in discrete segments of reality, segments which as such are
abstract and do not have an existence in themselves. Theories are answers
to problems, often highly special and context-bound problems. Think, for
instance, of the experimental context of the natural sciences and the
historical context of the human sciences.
Professionalism is more vulnerable than science itself to this identifi-
cation of theories with reality, or, to use a technical term, to reification.
Therapists who identify their models with reality regard these models as
paradigms, as normative descriptions of standard cases, with which their
patients should comply. The now almost outdated model of emotional
catharsis may serve as an illustration. Generations of psychotherapists
have used this model as the standard of therapeutic action and, even, of
mental health in general. The cognitive model of affective and anxiety
disorders is another example. This model seems to support a view in
which humans primarily are seen as a self-reflective and active agents,
who deliberately take their destiny in their own hands.
These examples also show the low degree of abstraction of many of
our theories. Many theories that guide our therapeutic activities are mainly
descriptive. In my opinion, this enhances the tendency to ignore the
distinction between theory and clinical reality.
3. Some answers
In this section I will briefly review some of the answers that have been
given to these concerns, especially in the Netherlands.
3.1. The 'just do your job'approach
The first approach is quite obvious from the preceding. I call it the 'just
do your job approach'. The practitioner argues that if the main problem is
the identification of theories with (descriptions of) reality, then the only
thing we have to do is to be aware of the abstract nature of our theories
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and models. If reduction so easily leads to reductionism, we should realize
that we are permanently inclined to hypostatize our theories and to falsely
attribute to them a normative status.
I agree that it is important to accept these basic truths. However, this
does not suffice. According to the 'just do your job approach' pro-
fessionals should strictly limit their activities to those tasks or domains in
which they are qualified. However, patients don't limit their problems and
complaints to a particular domain. When they tell us about their suffering,
often both psychological and religious components can be discovered.
Hopelessness is a good example. It often has both an emotional and an
existential meaning. Anxiety, fear, despair, feelings of wonhlessness and
insufficiency are other important examples. Should we ignore the existen-
tial and religious implications of these emotions, simply because we are
not professionally qualified in these domains?
It is not easy to answer this question. We seem to be caught in a
dilemma. Society, in particular the professional institutions and organi-
zations of which we are members, increasingly compels us to pro-
fessionalize our helping relationships, often at the expense of the patient
as a believer. As Christians, however, we would like to interpret our
actions as instances of the biblical, say more 'holistic', notion of healing,
i.e., as expressions of the power of forgiveness, conversion, gratitude,
and surrender. But this could imply an ignoring of the patient as a patient,
i.e., as a person suffering from some particular kind of 'pathology',
which can only be discovered with the assistance of a particular theory, or
model.
3.2. The 'just be sure of your attitude'approach
At this stage in discussions like these, one almost always hears another
voice, representing what I call the 'just be sure of your attitude' approach.
People who adhere to this approach say that our discussion so far has
omitted an important issue, namely the attitude of the therapist. The term
attitude is used here in a broad sense and refers to the personality of the
therapist, to his or her dedication to the patient, his or her capacity to
empathize and to instill hope, in short, to a number of personal qualities
which embody a particular world view. Adherents of this view say that
these personal qualities are ultimately decisive in therapy. This approach
amounts to a kind of relativism with regard to the role of theories and
models in psychotherapy. Therapeutic success would depend primarily on
how one behaves, and much less on what one says. In this approach the
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presumed tendency to secularism of psychotherapeutic models can be
conquered - or at least undone or resisted - by the 'attitude' of the Chris-
tian therapist.
I think, that the 'just be sure of your attitude approach' is completely
right in pointing to the difference between theory and therapy. Therapeutic
interventions are not based on logical deductions from scientific theories.
In this respect, therapy could be compared to playing chess. In order to
win a match, chess players do not concentrate on the rules of chess as
such, which are quite trivial. However, they do concentrate on all kinds of
tactical manoeuvres and on special features of the opponent's game.
Therapists also do not focus on theories and models for their own sake.
For them also theories may become quite trivial. Therapists do, however,
concentrate on special features of the patient's history, on types of inter-
ventions, on timing and phrasing, and on all sorts of things that belong to
the tactical side of therapeutic action.
If the comparison of psychotherapy with a game of chess is valid, then
Christian professionalism should be seen as primarily concerned with the
discovery of new moves and tactical strategies, and not with the definition
of new, constitutive rules, i.e., the formulation of new theories and
models. And if this, indeed, would be our task, then we, as Christian
professionals, should not cross the boundaries which are drawn by the
established theories and models. These theories and models would then
define the rules or boundary-conditions that are constitutive for pro-
fessional activity. These boundary-conditions would determine which
activities can count as therapy and which can not.
As I have said, the 'just be sure of your attitude' approach is right in
pointing to the distinction between theory and method (or therapy).
However, it goes too far. The ideal of a scientific account of the intricate
relations between psychology and religion is given up too soon. By
drawing back to the 'attitudinal' (personal) aspects of the therapeutic
endeavor, this approach implicitly assumes that the existential and reli-
gious roots of psychopathology cannot be studied from a scientific point of
view. Moreover, this approach accepts too easily the established theories
and models, as if an empirical or philosophical critique of these theories
and models would be superfluous. And, finally, it seems to overlook the
fact that the distinction between 'attitude' (in the broad sense just men-
tioned) and content, between 'how' and 'what', is perhaps not as tight as
the analogy with a game of chess seems to suggest. The relation between
theory and therapy is often compared with that between science and art.
However, the art of therapy is penetrated by theory. The exercise of
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psychotherapeute skills always involves a 'what'. We should know what
to listen to, what to ask, and what to interpret. Theories have much to say
about this 'what'.
3.3. The 'just be aware of the presuppositions'approach
We come to what I would like to call the 'just be aware of the presupposi-
tions approach'. This third approach is based on the kind of philosophical
critique which I just mentioned. It emphasizes that theories are not entities
in themselves, but should be evaluated as articulations of a prescientific
understanding of the world. Theories, it says, are based on presupposi-
tions which often are value-laden. They are condensations of a particular
social, moral and/or religious outlook. The basic premises of our theories
sometimes remain hidden. Despite their hiddenness these premises may be
very influential in professional practice. So we must be aware of these
premises, in order to avoid their creeping in through the back door.
In my opinion, this third approach also highlights an important point.
Psychodynamic, behavioral, and systemic theories all have a specific
flavor. They conjure up a certain image of the human person. These
images have a normative status. This normativity is rarely discussed but is
inevitably influential in therapeutic practice. This influence is strongly
enhanced by another factor which is worth mentioning, i.e., the institu-
tional embeddedness of the great schools of psychotherapy. Most of these
schools have their own institutions, with their own training programs,
standards of certification, and more or less articulated philosophies. These
philosophies contribute in a rather intractable but powerful way to the
'Bildung' of psychotherapists. So, there is indeed the important task of a
philosophical analysis and critique of the images of the human person that
are transmitted from one generation to the other in these training insti-
tutes. We may add that this critique extends to other institutions in the
field of mental health care, although the picture may be less clear here
from a philosophical point of view.
My only objection to this third approach is that it is largely negative
and global. It does not contribute very much to a positive formulation of
the identity of Christian psychotherapists.
I conclude, and return to my initial point regarding the relation
between professionalism and secularization. We have recognized a ten-
dency to secularism both in the disregard of the abstract nature of scien-
tific theories and models and in the uncritical assumption of the basic
premises of the major psychothérapeute schools. I refer to what has been
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said with respect to the first and the third approach, respectively. To
withdraw to the position - expressed by the second approach - in which it
is only one's attitude, that matters, turned out to be unsatisfactory, since it
gave up the whole idea of a scientific approach of the interrelatedness of
emotion, motivation, and spirituality. Finally, we have underscored that
norms, values, and various images of the human person, are embodied in
the institutional practices in which trainees are immersed during their
professional education. There are many ways in which professionalism
reinforces secularism, and vice versa.
4. Outline of a synthesis and reformulation
4.1. Values in professional practice
I will now formulate some of my own convictions, in order to find a way
out of the dilemmas of being a Christian professional. My sketch will be
mainly integrative, since there was a kernel of truth in all three of the
approaches discussed above.
As Tjeltveit has argued in his chapter in this book, the concept of
professionalism is still strongly associated with the idea that psychotherapy
and other kinds of mental help should be value-free. I have attacked that
idea from two sides: from a practical point of view by pointing to the
personal qualities of therapists, which always involves a normative aspect,
even in the very standard of professionalism; and from a philosophical
point of view, by referring to the basic premises that underlie theories and
the institutional practices which are based on them. We can add to this a
third consideration, which was pointed out by Vande Kemp in her contri-
bution. Historically, psychology and psychotherapy can be seen as
emancipatory movements that tried to liberate the soul from quackery, ill-
founded medical treatment, and clerical authority. Seen from this perspec-
tive, it comes as no surprise that there has been much more discussion
between the spokesmen of these new movements and representatives of
more traditional approaches, in particular the clergy, than generally is
acknowledged - think for instance of the classical debate between Freud
and Pfister. When, today, these discussions seem to be reiterated, they
should not be considered as a kind of corpus alienum in a field which as
such has to be regarded as value-free. On the contrary, these discussions,
which psychology and psychiatry simply have forgotten, bring these
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disciplines back to their roots and touch the nerve of our therapeutic
endeavor.
When it is acknowledged that professionalism never can be value-free,
one may wonder why the second part of the title of this conference has
been formulated as it is: Beyond Professionalism. Does this expression not
implicitly suggest that professionalism is something in itself, without any
intrinsic relation with norms and values, and with faith and religion as
belonging to a realm 'beyond professionalism'? This issue was raised by
Labooy (cf. his chapter in this book). He expressed his doubts about the
traditional accounts of professionalism by declaring that faith is not
external to (or beyond) the therapeutic process, but that it is at the very
heart of it. It is even constitutive of professionalism. I am sympathetic to
his account, in the sense that there is a strong similarity between some of
the constituents of the life of a Christian and non-specific therapeutic
factors such as hope, trust, and altruism. However, what has to be
clarified further is whether this similarity can be interpreted as an identity,
and, if so, under which conditions. In other words, we must ask what
kind of faith is fundamental for the therapeutic process: is it Christian
faith only? or are more general types of hope and trust also to be
included? What does this position imply for psychotherapy and psychiatry
as scientifically based, professional activities?
To answer these questions systematically, we should take into account
a number of distinctions. Some of them have been mentioned previously,
others will be introduced here. In my argument, I will take three steps:
(1) First, I will introduce a distinction among four levels of analysis in
the conceptualization of psychopathology, i.e., four types of knowl-
edge that are involved in the study and treatment of mental disorder.
(2) Second, a distinction will be made between the conceptual (or struc-
tural) and the practical dimensions of therapy; i.e., between the
conceptual matrix on which therapy is based, and the contexts and
practices in which these concepts are used and/or mediated.
(3) Third, I will briefly concentrate on the opening up of the affective
aspect, in particular the opening up of the moment of faith in psycho-
therapy.
4.2. The distinction among four levels of analysis
To clarify what goes on in the office of the doctor or the therapist, I
think, it is useful to make a distinction among four types of knowledge.
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These types of knowledge are characterized by an increasing degree of
abstraction. I have first formulated this scheme in my thesis on anxiety
disorders (Glas 1991). I believe it can be applied to the entire field of
psychotherapy and psychology.
(1) The level of everyday experience of signs and symptoms as they are
communicated to the doctor in his or her office;
(2) The clinical level, i.e., the level of clinical diagnosis and decision
making, characterized by the three-step process of
(a) trying to discern a pattern in the story of the patient (signs, com-
plaints),
(h) identifying the disorder (diagnosis), and
(c) taking some therapeutical action (clinical decision making);
(3) The scientific level, i.e. biological, psychological, social, and develop-
mental research, characterized by the analysis and abstraction of
affective, cognitive and social processes, and disordered functions and
relations;
(4) The meta-theoretical or philosophical level, which describes the basic
premises of theoretical models in medicine and psychology.
There is one point in this scheme that immediately attracts attention. This
is the distinction of the clinical as a separate level representing a separate
knowledge type. I think, indeed, that this is an important distinction. At
least in psychiatry, as a branch of medicine, there is a strong tendency to
reduce clinical practice to the (scientific) application of general concepts to
individual cases. Clinical practice, it is said, should become 'clinical
science'. The distinction of the clinical level as a separate level is an
attempt to do justice to clinical knowledge as a kind of knowledge that
aims at the individual patient (cf. Albert et al. 1988; Hunter 1989;
Munson 1981; Thomasma 1988; Toulmin 1976). Earlier, I pointed to the
importance of the distinction between theory and therapy by referring to
the tactical aspect of therapy (the metaphor of a game of chess). Here I
state my rationale for this assertion.
Clinical practice is concentrated on the patient in his or her unique life
situation. In principle, there is no function or quality which can be
excluded from consideration by the clinician. Science, on the other hand,
is concentrated on a particular aspect of reality. It excludes many facets of
individual functioning. Because of this concentration on the unique
coherence of functions in the individual patient, clinical knowledge has a
peculiar conceptual nature: it points to both the individual and the univer-
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sal. It refers to the individual because of the uniqueness of the patient,
including his or her pathology. It aims at the universal by referring to
general concepts, like depression, oedipal conflict, or narcissistic collu-
sion. Miss A and Mister B both have a depression. This is the universal
dimension. However, Miss A's depression differs in many respects from
Mister B's depression. This is the individual dimension.
This clarifies why the second admonition 'be sure of your attitude'
makes some sense. The clinical orientation of the therapist is only partly
based on theoretical constructs and ideas. It belongs to the kind of exper-
tise that is learned in practice, rather than by studying textbooks. This
expertise consists of the capacity to diagnose correctly and to treat proper-
ly in the individual situation. It is a capacity to act in a proper way in
situations in which there is both similarity and dissimilarity with respect to
standard cases'.
The scheme also illustrates some of the merits of the first and the
third approach. The first approach ('just do your job') emphasized the
abstract nature of theoretical concepts and models. Science searches for
general relations, rather than individual specificity. Its focus is in the
opposite direction as that of clinical practice. The third approach high-
lighted the importance of basic premises. This is worked out in the
distinctions of the fourth level.
4.3. The distinction between conceptual structure and practice
There is, however, a weakness in this scheme which basically refers to
different degrees of abstraction in the conceptualization of
psychopathology, i.e. to different knowledge types. These different
degrees (or levels) of abstraction were indicated by referring to the
different practices or situations, in which the languages of the patient, the
clinician, the scientist, and the philosopher, respectively, are born. But
can we maintain that these situations or practices in every respect corre-
1
 The process of clinical decision making can be compared to what Aristotle, in his
Ethica Nicomachea, has called phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence). Phronèsis is the
disposition to act in a morally justified way in situations in which a given moral rule does
not provide a clue which is immediately applicable. The background of this notion is that
courageous behavior in one situation may become recklessness in another situation. The
virtue of courage as such does not provide a clue in that case with respect to the type of
behavior which can count as courageous. The capacity to act morally in such situations
depends on the virtue of practical wisdom, and not on (he ability to infer particular types
of behavior from general rules by the faculty of reason.
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spond to knowledge types? Are the activities of the clinician or the
scientist as such always more abstract than the activities of the patient in
the consulting room? Does not the opposite hold too, that the activity of a
scientist in the laboratory is, in a certain sense, just as concrete as the
activity of the patient who tells us about her complaints?
In my opinion, this objection is partly valid. It points to the need of
another distinction, i.e., that between knowledge types and the practices,
in which these knowledge types are embedded. Making this additional
distinction offers us the advantage of a more fine-grained account of the
complexity of clinical reality. First, it enables us to do justice to different
types of practice. Second, it underscores a point that was already men-
tioned, that theories and models do not have reality as entities in them-
selves. The meaning of a particular piece of knowledge is molded by the
practice in which it is developed or used.
From now on, I will concentrate my argument on the nature of
clinical practice, the second level. I believe that at least three inter-related
types of practice can be discerned at the clinical level, each with their own
rules governing them (Table 1).
The three contexts of clinical practice
Table I
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First, there is the cognitive practice of diagnosis and clinical decision
making. Generally speaking, this process is guided by cognitive rules. It
can, to a certain extent, be simulated by computer programs.
Second, there is the practice of treatment and care. This practice is
based on diagnosis. It demands a lot of expertise, because of the individ-
ual features of the case. The general treatment regime should be adapted
to the individual patient. The rules involved here relate to what might be
called 'clinical' or 'practical wisdom'.
Third, we may delineate a wider context determined by the moral
appeal of the patient. The answer to this appeal depends on the moral and
religious rules with respect to which therapist and patient have reached
mutual agreement.
To summarize, the clinical knowledge type is molded to the individual
case. The clinical situation in which this happens is determined by cogni-
tive, 'practical wisdom'-like, and moral rules. These rules show a certain
order which can represented in a scheme of three concentric circles, the
inner one related to cognitive rules, the middle one to rules of practical
wisdom and therapeutic expertise, and the outer one to moral (and reli-
gious) rules.
4.4. The opening up of the affective aspect
A full account of the process of opening up (or disclosure) would require
a short introduction into the systematic philosophy of the Dutch philos-
opher Herman Dooyeweerd (1953-1958). I will not offer this introduction
here. I refer to the work of Dooyeweerd himself or one of the introduc-
tions to his work (Kalsbeek 1975; Van Woudenberg 1992), and also to my
attempts to apply and refine some of his distinctions in the field of
emotions and emotion theory (Glas 1989).
It is here that, I think, we may find a key component of the solution
for the quandary about being a secularized professional or a Christian
non-professional. Of course the affective or emotional dimensions of the
person are not the only significant area in psychotherapy. There are other
variables as well, especially distortions and deficits in cognitive and social
functioning. For sake of brevity, however, let me concentrate on affect. I
will limit my argument to three remarks.
First, human functioning can be analyzed as a structural whole, in
which a number of substructures are bound in what might be called the
act-structure (Table 2). These substructures are: the physical, the biologi-
cal, and the psychic. These structures are called substructures because of
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their relative independence on the one hand and their integral relation to
the other substructures and the act-structure on the other hand. The act-
structure is not bound to a particular aspect of human functioning. That is
to say, our acts certainly can be distinguished with respect to their cogni-
tive, social, economical, juridical, aesthetic, ethical and/or religious
qualities, but these qualities pass into each other and vary virtually every
moment. Because of these transitions our acts seem to possess a much
more flexible structure than do the substructures.
Human functioning as a structural whole
Psychic substructure
Biotic substructure
Physical
substructure
Table 2
Human emotional life, which partly belongs to the psychic substructure,
functions autonomously to a certain extent, but at the same time never
exists as an entity in itself. Emotions are often taken up in intentional
actions and other kinds of behavior. The feeling of anger may be taken up
in the acts of clenching one's fists and of shouting to the person who is
the object of one's anger. The feeling of anxiety is an important factor in
the genesis of avoidance behavior. The feeling component is strongly
179
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connected with the behavior component. This brings me to my second
remark.
Human emotions differ from animal emotions because of their rich-
ness of meaning. They may prepare for, or be an element of an immense
diversity of acts and act-like behaviors, such as thinking, remembering,
desiring, avoiding, sighing, groaning, grumbling, and so on. This richness
and this preparing for all kinds of activities can be captured by the
technical term 'anticipation' (Table 3). Anticipation in particular refers to
the reflection of elements of the higher functions in human emotional life
which as such is a part of the psychic substructure. Dooyeweerd called
these elements 'analogies' or 'analogical moments'.
The opening-up of structures in the anticipatory direction
Actstrocture
II
jj Psychic substructure
»ii
|| Biouc substructure
II
|| Physical substructure
* pistic function
* ethical function
* juridical function
* aesthetical function
* economical function
* social function
* historical function
* lingual function
* logical function
logical - pistic anticipations
psychic - pistic anticipations
biotic - pistic anticipations
Table3
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So, emotional life is co-determined by analogical moments which antici-
pate the higher functions of the act-structure. It is important to note that
these elements, as such, belong to the affective domain. Feelings of trust
and hope, for instance, can be interpreted as feelings that anticipate faith.
As such, i.e. as feelings, they remain within the boundaries of emotional
life. The words 'trust' and 'hope', of course, may denote other events,
acts of trust or hope, for instance, acts that bear witness of our confidence
in somebody or in a particular state of affairs. In the affective domain,
however, they denote trust and hope as feelings.
Saying that these feelings are instances of the opening up of affective
life means that in these feelings those moments of our emotive life are
activated or articulated which anticipate faith. To imagine what is meant
here, one may recall what happens in cases in which these anticipatory
moments seem to be atrophied. In severe depression, for instance, the
psychic or, more precisely, the affective component of the psychic
substructure, is closed. The expression and articulation of anticipatory
moments is impeded. Consequently, the act-structure is distorted also:
psychomotor behavior is retarded and there is a lack of initiative. In the
most severe cases even a term like hopelessness seems to say too much,
since there is virtually nothing to be hopeless about. Hopelessness may
become a state without an object. What remains is the psychical experi-
ence as such, without reference to an object or a cause, a dull, nagging,
pressing feeling of fatigue and of complete inefficacy. In less severe cases
the feeling of hopelessness has an object (or a series of objects), for
instance, one's failure with respect to a particular task or the conviction
that one is rejected by God or one's fellow humans.
In my opinion, this provisional analysis may clarify why the dilemma
about being either a secularized professional or a Christian non-pro-
fessional is based on such an inadequate conception of professionalism.
Our analysis suggests that psychotherapy can be seen as an activity that
aims at the opening up of the affective domain, i.e., at the creation and/or
re-construction of all sorts of anticipatory moments, the moment of faith
included. When this analysis is accepted, the only conclusion can be that
this opening up is both a highly professional and a thoroughly normative
activity. It is professional because of the degree of sensitivity and exper-
tise that is required to perceive which aspects of the disrupted affective
structure should be reorganized and/or strengthened. It is normative
because of the moral and religious choices which inevitably emerge when
the process of opening up of affectivity proceeds.
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With respect to normativity one final question must be faced. What
kind of guidance or help should the therapist offer with respect to moral
and religious choices? I have already clarified that the opening up process
as such is a normative process and that, because of this, psychotherapy is
both professional and normative. However, ultimately patients may choose
for a tragic vision on life or for resignation, instead of for a rich and
hopeful or even a Christian view. From a practical point of view, the
answer is not as difficult as it may seem. First, guidance depends on the
kind of negotiations between the patient and the therapist in their initial
meetings. Second, it depends on the kind of therapy. Non-directive
therapies don't lend themselves for active guidance and advice, directive
therapies do. Third, it depends on the kind of pathology. Strong sugges-
tions and advice may induce regression and dependency. Finally, it
depends on the stage of the therapy. In my experience, a free discussion
of religious and moral issues is natural in the final stages of some kinds of
therapy. Careful suggestions may then be appropriate. These suggestions
almost never come as a surprise. They were already in the air. They
articulate what in an implicit way was always present, namely the moral
and/or religious outlook which was embodied in the attitude of the
therapist.
My final word here is hope. The suggestive effects of the Christian
outlook, embodied in our professional attitudes, are well-founded. If God
has created our earth and the order on which our insights are based, then
our efforts to open up parts of created reality point to Him. Hopelessness
never will bring about the fullness of creational possibilities, it can only
lead to atrophy and boredom. Our hope, embodied in our attitude, will be
a manifestation of the coming Kingdom.
5. Summary and suggestions
The professional ization of psychotherapy and psychiatry seems almost
inevitably to imply a secularization of the helping relationship. By focus-
ing on specific qualities of the patient's pathology, the therapist ignores
other aspects, for instance the intricate interlacing of psychopathology and
existential problems. We seem to be trapped in a dilemma, the choice
between the institutional and societal pressures to professionalize our
helping relationships on the one hand (at the expense of the patient as a
believer) and the biblical notion of 'wholeness' and healing on the other
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hand (at the expense of the patient as a patient, i.e. as a person suffering
from some particular kind of pathology).
However, there is a way to resolve this apparent dilemma,
(1) when human functioning is conceptualized as an ordered complex of
hierarchically layered functional modes,
(2) when the abstract nature of the theories on which therapeutic interven-
tions are based is acknowledged, and
(3) when a distinction is made between theory and therapy (with its own
normativity).
I finish with some recommendations.
My argument, briefly stated, points to diversification and refinement.
Let me mention in which directions we might search for this refinement.
What we need first is a clear delineation and enumeration of what I have
called 'anticipatory moments', in particular of those moments that antici-
pate faith. Trust, gratitude, surrender, guilt, reciprocity, and love are
mentioned as potential candidates.
Second, there is the challenge of developing a Christian existential
approach to psychotherapy, which could expand on elements of the work
of Viktor Frankl (1987), Rollo May (1983) and Irving Yalom (1980). I
recognize that these great psychotherapists were more or less inspired by
humanism. In my opinion, however, their attempts are in the right
direction. A number of contributions in this book, in particular those that
are concentrated on the treatment of traumatized people, point to the need
for an existential approach. Traumas threaten the core values on which
our self-esteem is based. Traditional psychodynamic treatments sometimes
reach the existential level, but they are seldom adequate to encompass the
full range of questions which are at stake here.
Next, empirical research could unravel some of the therapeutic factors
which are so important in therapy, in particular those related to ultimate
commitments.
Fourth, more work must be done on the elucidation of the relations
between theory, methods, and therapeutic attitudes. Clarifying these
relations would greatly improve our insight into the relations among
psychotherapy, counseling, and pastoral care.
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